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In his paper, Marco Stier argues that men-
tal disorders are irreducible to the brain
and cannot be determined in a purely
physical manner (Stier, 2013). Instead,
he argues that mental disorders can only
be determined on the mental level since
behavior can only be termed deviant by
comparing it to the norms of non-deviant
behavior. Thomas Schramme proposes
that a psychological conceptualization of
mental disorders is necessary since the
concept of mental illness is autonomous
from somatic medicine and that psychia-
try will not find the cure it is looking for
through neurobiology (Schramme, 2013).
In the following, I present my personal
argument for: (i) why neurobiological
research offers the potential for identifying
curative therapies for mental disorders
despite the lack of a valid explanatory
model on the mental level (albeit not to
the extent psychiatrists may wish); and
(ii) that such research is needed to estab-
lish more valid disease models on the
mental level. In other words, an under-
standing of the biological underpinnings
of the mental disorders is a prerequisite
for a valid disease model. If the definition
of deviant behavior requires norms, these
norms, and the degree of deviance, will
not only depend on the observed behav-
ior per se but also on our understanding of
its biological underpinnings and its vari-
ance. To illustrate this point I will cite
two examples. Firstly, phenotypically iden-
tical hallucinations are conceptualized dif-
ferently depending on whether they are
the consequence of a high fever or the
symptoms of schizophrenia, and whether
effective treatment is readily available or
not. Secondly, the inability to spell cor-
rectly due to dyslexia is judged differently
to poor spelling that is attributable to a
lack of care or effort (and dyslexia has for
the majority of the past 2000 years of our
history almost totally escaped diagnosis).
Thus, a concept which is not supported
by knowledge of the etiological underpin-
nings can only be partial and, as Hanfried
Helmchen points out, potentially danger-
ous for patients (Helmchen, 2013).
Furthermore, I argue that the con-
cept of “mental disorder” should be aban-
doned or at least not confined to the so
called mental/psychiatric disorders, as in
my opinion mental disorders are somatic
disorders, and the so-called somatic disor-
ders also associated with varying numbers
of psychiatric symptoms.
As a psychiatric geneticist whose
research aim is to identify genes involved
in the development of psychiatric dis-
orders, I believe that all of the observed
clinical symptoms have a biological corre-
late. The extent to which different societies
in different time periods will conceptu-
alize these symptoms as “pathological”
will depend on the society in question.
Factors such as the severity of the individ-
ual’s suffering (e.g., paranoia, anxiety) or
the degree of severity attributed to given
symptoms by society (e.g., obesity, gam-
bling, sexual deviations) will play a role.
Nevertheless the biological underpinnings
of deviations from the so-called “nor-
mal” will, in many cases, be identifiable.
Although I personally consider it unlikely
that science will ever provide an exclusively
neurophysiological explanation of mental
disorders, I am convinced that diagnosis
will eventually be based upon assessment
of the physiology of the individual patient.
At present however, no such biology-
guided diagnoses exist. Although research
has established that mental disorders
are complex and that their develop-
ment involves interactions between genetic
and environmental factors, their etiol-
ogy remains largely unknown. Current
psychiatric classification systems, such as
DSM and ICD, define psychiatric disor-
ders as distinct disease entities. According
to these diagnostic systems, a diagnosis
should be assigned when a given num-
ber of symptoms have been present over
a specified period of time. Despite high
diagnostic reliability between psychiatrists
and evidence from family studies that rel-
atives of index patients have an increased
risk of being assigned the same diag-
nosis, the clinical presentation of psy-
chiatric disorders differs widely between
patients, and diverse courses and out-
comes are observed within diagnostic cat-
egories. Furthermore, no single clinical
symptom is either pathognomonic of, or
necessary for, a given psychiatric diagno-
sis, and considerable symptom-overlap is
observed between diagnostic categories.
As, in contrast to somatic disorders, no
objective laboratorymeasures are yet avail-
able to refine psychiatric diagnosis, the
establishment of a diagnostic system that is
biologically based will require amore com-
prehensive knowledge of the etiology and
pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders
and/or their presenting symptoms.
Since Griesinger, biological psychiatry
has conceptualized psychiatric illnesses as
disorders of the brain. However, other
brain disorders such as migraine, epilepsy,
and neoplasms are generally treated by
neurologists rather than psychiatrists. In
cases where a causal biological reason
for psychotic or depressive symptoms
has been identified, the disorder ceases
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to be a mental disease in the strict
sense of the term. This is exemplified
by endocrine conditions (e.g., porphyria,
hyper-, and hypothyroidism); metabolic
conditions (e.g., hypoglycaemia); hepatic,
renal, or autoimmune conditions; and
viral infections. Indeed a DSM criterion
for assigning a diagnosis of schizophrenia
is that “The disturbance is not attributable
to the physiological effects of a substance
or another medical condition.” Similarly,
a DSM diagnosis of psychotic disor-
der requires that “no specific and direct
causative physiological mechanisms asso-
ciated with a medical condition can be
demonstrated.”
Recent findings in psychiatric genetics
may provide insights into how mental dis-
order should be conceptualized. For many
years, whole genome screening and the
process of relating millions of genetic vari-
ants with a complex disorder while taking
into account environmental factors and
personal life-experiences were considered
impossible. However, these processes are
now available to researchers.
In recent decades, extensive efforts
have been made to identify susceptibil-
ity factors for psychiatric disorders such
as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism,
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
major depression, and alcohol depen-
dence. The results of formal genetic inves-
tigations, e.g., family, twin, and adoption
studies, have provided unequivocal evi-
dence that environmental factors as well
as inherited genetic variation play a sub-
stantial role in the etiology of these dis-
orders. Heritability estimates suggest that
genetic factors account for 75–80% of
the variability observed in susceptibility
to schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism
and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
and 35–50% of that for alcohol addiction
and major depression. For other common
complex disorders, such as diabetes, breast
cancer, and Crohn’s disease, heritability
ranges between 55 and 70% (Sullivan
et al., 2012). Thus, the contribution of
genetic factors to schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and autism is relatively high.
Schizophrenia is also one of the complex
common disorders that account for the
majority of genome-wide significant find-
ings identified in genome-wide association
studies (GWAS) since their introduction in
less than a decade ago.
Recent calculations indicate that
around 6000–10,000 common variant are
involved in the etiology of schizophrenia,
and that these variants are not confined
to genes expressed in the central nervous
system (Ripke et al., 2013). Rather, these
variants are located across all chromo-
somes. It is therefore very likely that the
influence of these variants is not restricted
to the brain. Thus, a given variant could
act as a risk factor for both, a men-
tal as well as a somatic disorder. Many
somatic and mental disorders display
co-morbidity, and the question there-
fore arises as to whether these conditions
should be viewed as two separate dis-
eases, or whether such states represent
a single disease with somatic as well as
mental manifestations. Formal genetic
studies of co-morbidity between cardio-
vascular disease and depressive disorders,
e.g., suggest the latter. Furthermore, ini-
tial molecular genetic studies suggest that
stress, for example, is a risk factor for both
depression and cardiovascular disease:
the influence of a major risk gene (FTO)
for obesity is particularly pronounced in
depressed persons, and genetic variation
in the” stress gene” NPY modifies weight
gain under conditions of stress.
Interestingly, among the most sig-
nificant findings for schizophrenia
are variants located in the Major
Histocompatibility Complex Region, a
locus which hosts, among others, genes
responsible for immune reactions. This
evidence underlines the finding of formal
genetic and candidate gene studies that
genetic as well as environmental factors
contribute to these disorders.
I argue that all mental disorders are
somatic disorders, and that what we cur-
rently term mental disorders are actually
somatic disorders for which the somatic
component is too weak to be detected.
That is, due to the high sensitivity of
the human brain, and the extreme level
of functioning demanded of it in mod-
ern life, even harmless somatic changes
may have a detrimental influence on brain
function.
An example may serve to illustrate
this point. Genetic and biochemical stud-
ies indicate that immunological processes
play an important role in depression, or at
least in a subset of them. Viral infections
such as a common cold in turn also involve
immunological reactions and can present
with all of the symptoms required to assign
a diagnosis of MD (e.g., markedly dimin-
ished interest or pleasure in almost all
activities, fatigue, diminished ability to
concentrate, loss of appetite, hypersom-
nia). If such an infection escapes diag-
nosis it is possible that the patients will
receive the diagnosis of depression. I per-
sonally have seen patients who had been
assigned a diagnosis of depression and
who actually had suffered from unrecog-
nized infections such as borreliose and
hepatitis. New infectious agents are iden-
tified each year, and it is possible that a
proportion of patients who are diagnosed
with depression today are being misdi-
agnosed since the causal agent has not
yet been identified. But the question is
whether this really should be considered a
simple misdiagnosis.
While I would argue that all men-
tal disorders are in fact somatic disorders
(including the brain as an organ), this
implies neither that the cause must origi-
nate in the soma, nor that conclusions may
be drawn concerning the optimal mode of
treatment.
Numerous studies have shown that fac-
tors, such as poverty, stressful life events,
and child abuse, are major risk factors
for depression (although the effect of
a given environmental factor can differ
substantially depending on the genetic
make-up of the individual). Furthermore,
the environment can have long lasting
effects in terms of which genes will be
expressed. This in turn will influence how
that particular individual will respond
to a future environmental stimulus. A
decade ago, research in rats demonstrated
for the first time that post-natal mater-
nal care could influence stress hormone
receptors, and that this predisposed the
affected animal to more pronounced reac-
tions to stress in later life (Szyf et al.,
2005). These findings were subsequently
replicated in humans. Furthermore, a
human genome-wide methylation study
by our group revealed that prenatal
maternal stress impacted on the methy-
lation pattern in the newborn. These
results were then replicated in stud-
ies of monkeys and rats. Thus, envi-
ronmental factors can impact on mental
well-being through the soma, and can
therefore predispose to further reactions
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to environmental factors through somatic
signatures. Further knowledge is needed
to define whether the optimal therapy for
the resulting depression should be deliv-
ered on a direct somatic level or through
psychotherapy.
To conclude: I argue firstly, that all
mental disorders are somatic disorders,
and that somatic disorders present with
varying proportions of somatic and/or
mental symptoms; and secondly, that both
the identification of the underlying genetic
and environmental factors as well as opti-
mal causal therapies is important and
feasible. This neurobiological approach
is promising even in the absence of a
valid disease model on the mental level
and will in turn inform such a model.
Independent of current disease models, it
is important for therapists to remember
that patients suffer from their symptoms
per se rather than from the underlying
causes of these symptoms. Thus, the
management of patients who display men-
tal symptoms—with or without somatic
symptoms—requires both an understand-
ing of the nature and subjective impact
of these symptoms and appropriate ther-
apeutic empathy.
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